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Abstract
This paper re-examines the validity of the monetary exchange rate model during the
post-Bretton Woods era for 18 OECD countries. Our analysis simultaneously considers
the presence of both cross-sectional dependence and multiple structural breaks, which
have not received much attention in previous studies of the monetary model. The empiri-
cal results indicate that the monetary model emerges only when the presence of structural
breaks and cross-country dependence has been taken into account. Evidence is also pro-
vided suggesting that the breaks in the monetary model can be derived from the underlying
purchasing power parity relation.
JEL Classification: C32; C33; F31; F41.
Keywords: Monetary exchange rate model; Purchasing power parity; Panel cointegra-
tion; Structural break; Cross-section dependence.
1 Introduction
Lately, there has been renewed interest in the monetary model of exchange rate determina-
tion, which states that the nominal exchange rate between two countries is determined by
their relative levels of money supply and output. The by far most scrutinized proposition
of this model is that exchange rates, relative money supply and relative output should be
nonstationary and cointegrated.
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Despite its strong theoretical appeal, however, the empirical success of the monetary
model on an individual country-by-country basis has been rather limited, to say the least.
For instance, Sarantis (1994) examines whether the monetary model holds for a collection
of four countries between 1973 and 1990, and is unable to reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration. Recently, Rapach and Wohar (2002) employ annual data over the period 1880
to 1995 for 14 industrialized countries, and find that although there are some evidence of
cointegration for eight of the countries, for the remaining six, there are no such evidence.
Thus, the empirical performance of the monetary model on an individual country-by-
country basis has not been very convincing. But as Taylor and Taylor (2004) point out, time
series results of this kind should not be taken too seriously, as the failure to reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration is more likely to reflect the low power of the tests employed
rather than the failure of the monetary model.
One way to increase the power of such tests is to use not just one time series but a panel of
multiple series. The panel data framework not only provides more data, which is a prerequisite
for any sound empirical work, but also increases the power and accuracy of conventional time
series unit root and cointegration tests, see Breitung and Pesaran (2008) for a recent overview
of the literature. Two of the earliest studies within this field are those of Groen (2000) and
Mark and Sul (2001). Groen (2000) employs a panel of quarterly data covering 14 OECD
countries between 1973Q1 and 1994Q4. He finds evidence of cointegration for his G10 and
full samples for both United States dollar and German mark numeraire currencies. Mark and
Sul (2001) employ quarterly data for 18 countries spanning the period 1973Q1 to 1997Q1.
They also find evidence of a cointegrating relationship consistent with the monetary model,
regardless of the choice of numeraire currency considered. Hence, based on these pieces of
evidence, the panel approach seems very promising indeed.
Notwithstanding, there are a number of shortcomings of most early panel data studies
of this sort that make their results difficult to interpret, and that may well has lead to an
overstatement of the results. Namely, that they are based on many restrictive assumptions.
One example is given by Rapach and Wohar (2004), who point out that the usual assumption
of a common data generating process for all the countries in the panel is unlikely to hold when
testing the monetary model. Consistent with this claim, the authors show that it is possible
to reject the homogeneity restrictions used by Mark and Sul (2001). They also show that
falsely imposed homogeneity makes the results biased in such a way that they would seem
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to fulfill the restrictions of the monetary model, which can very well explain the findings of
Mark and Sul (2001).
Another shortcoming of the early panel studies mentioned above is that they are based
on the assumption of cross-section independence among the countries in the panel. This as-
sumption is problematic in general, and it is violated almost surely in the current application,
as the use of a common numeraire country makes the remaining countries correlated.1 Yet
another example of the restrictiveness of earlier studies is that the possibility of structural
breaks is almost always ignored, which is likely to be particularly relevant when testing the
monetary model because of different exchange rate regimes. It is a well-known fact that erro-
neously omitted breaks can cause deceptive inference in time series testing, and it is expected
to materialize in the panel context too. The effects of structural breaks do not disappear
simply because one uses panel data.
In this paper, we simultaneously consider heterogeneity, cross-sectional dependence and
structural breaks, which have not received much attention in previous panel based studies of
the monetary exchange rate model. We accomplish this by applying two recently developed
panel tests to the same data used by Mark and Sul (2001). To test the order of integration
of the variables, we apply the panel stationarity test developed by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al.
(2005), which is flexible enough to account for a large amount of heterogeneity, cross-section
dependence and multiple unknown structural breaks. As a test for cointegration, we apply
the test of Westerlund (2005), which can be seen as a residual-based version of the Carrion-
i-Silvestre et al. (2005) test. Our results indicate that there is little evidence in favor of the
monetary model when the analysis does not account for the effects of cross-country dependence
and structural breaks. This conclusion is reversed when these features are taken into account.
In an attempt to bring some light on the origin of the estimated structural breaks, we
take a closer look at the purchasing power parity (PPP) relationship, which is one of the
fundamental building blocks of the monetary model. Numerous studies have documented the
presence of breaks in the PPP relation during the recent float era considered in this paper.2
Here, we follow Hegwood and Papell (1998) and permit for the possibility of structural breaks
in both the level and trend of the PPP relation for each country. The results show that most
1Indeed, as O’Connell (1998) notes, exchange rates constructed for instance using the United States as the
numeraire country contains two common components, namely the variation in the value of the dollar and the
variation in the corresponding price index. These two common components can be interpreted as common
shocks affecting all exchange rates in the panel.
2Some recent panel based PPP studies include Papell (2002), Im et al. (2005) and Harris et al. (2005).
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of the breaks in the monetary model can be attributed to breaks in the underlying PPP
relation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the monetary model,
while Section 3 discusses the econometric methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The monetary exchange rate model
We focus our attention to a slightly modified version of the monetary model adopted by Groen
(2002). Consider a panel comprised of t = 1, ..., T time series observations on i = 1, ..., N
countries. The United States is treated as the reference country and is henceforth denoted
by an asterisk. The monetary model is based on three important assumptions. The first
assumption is that the following real money demand relation holds for all countries
mit − pit = ηi + φiyit − γiiit + vit, (1)
wheremit, pit, yit and iit are the logarithm of money supply, aggregate price level, real income
and nominal interest rate, respectively. The parameters φi and γi are the income and interest
rate elasticities, respectively, and ηi is a country specific intercept. The disturbance vit is
modelled as stationary and mean zero.
The second assumption is that the following version of PPP holds for each country
pit = µij + τijt+ p∗t + sit + eit, (2)
where j = 1, ...,Mi + 1, p∗t is the logarithm of the United States aggregate price index, sit
is the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate between the domestic country and the United
States, and eit is a mean zero stationary disturbance. Moreover, as in Hegwood and Papell
(1998), and Papell and Prodan (2006), we allow the country specific intercept and trend
terms, here denoted by µij and τij , respectively, to vary over time. In particular, we allow
for the possibility of Mi structural breaks, or Mi + 1 regimes, as indicated by the index j.
Thus, there are Mi + 1 regimes for each country i with the jth regime running form Tij−1 to
Tij time series observations. In the terminology of Hegwood and Papell (1998), and Papell
and Prodan (2006), we assume that trend qualified PPP holds, which seems appropriate in
view of the episodic behavior of the dollar in the 1980’s. Indeed, as pointed out by Papell
(2002), nominal exchange rates are better characterized by long swings of appreciation and
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depreciation rather than by discrete mean jumps. In addition, besides its better ability to
explain the observed data, the allowance of the trend makes the model robust against possible
Balassa-Samuelson effects.3
Now, by combining equations (1) and (2), we obtain the following solution for the nominal
exchange rate
sit = αij + τijt+ (mit −m∗t )− φi(yit − y∗t ) + γi(iit − i∗t ) + uit, (3)
where αij = η∗ − ηi − µij and uit = v∗t − vit − eit. The final assumption is that the following
uncovered interest parity condition holds
Et(∆sit+1) = (iit − i∗t ), (4)
where the operators ∆ and Et signify the first difference and the expectation conditional on
the information set available at time t, respectively. By direct substitution of (4) into (3), it
is not difficult to see that
sit = αij + τijt+ (mit −m∗t )− φi(yit − y∗t ) + wit, (5)
where wit = γiEt(∆sit+1) + uit should be stationary since Et(∆sit+1) and uit are stationary
by construction. Therefore, since both empirical and theoretical work suggest that exchange
rates, relative money supply and output are nonstationary, the monetary model necessi-
tates that sit is cointegrated with (mit −m∗t ) and (yit − y∗t ) forming the cointegrating vector
(1, −φi)′.4
3 Econometric methodology
In this section, we briefly describe the panel stationary test of Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005)
and the panel cointegration test of Westerlund (2005). We begin by considering the simple
case when the countries are assumed to be independent, and then we continue to explain how
3The Balassa-Samuelson effect embodies the idea that divergent international productivity levels can, via
their effect on wages and home good prices, lead to permanent deviations from the no trend version of PPP.
The argument is based on the fact that if PPP holds for traded goods, then productivity differentials between
countries determine the domestic relative prices of non-tradables, leading in the long run to trend deviations
from PPP.
4Note the flexibility of the formulation in (5). Indeed as pointed out by Mark and Sul (2001), equation (5)
can be viewed as a generic representation of the long-run equilibrium exchange rate implied by most modern
theories of exchange rate determination. Note also that, like most other studies of this sort, we are testing for
cointegration in the reduced form of the monetary model rather than in the three building blocks separately,
although in Section 4.4 we take a closer look at the PPP relation.
5
the bootstrap procedure can be used to obtain valid tests when the members of the panel are
dependent.
3.1 The tests
We begin by considering the cointegration test. As mentioned in the previous section, when
exchange rates, relative money supply and relative output are nonstationary, the monetary
model requires these variables to be cointegrated. To this end, consider the following empirical
specification of our theoretical model
sit = αij + τijt+ βi(mit −m∗t ) + φi(yit − y∗t ) + wit, (6)
where βi and φi are country specific slope parameters that are assumed to be constant over
time, while αij and τij are again country specific intercept and trend parameters that are
subject to Mi structural breaks. The error wit is assumed to be generated as wit = git + εit,
where
git = git−1 + ρiεit
with εit having a mean zero and stationary distribution that is independent across i. The
fact that εit is only assumed to be stationary means that it can be both heteroskedastic and
serially correlated. That is, not only is the cointegration vector permitted to differ across
both regimes and countries, the long-run variance of εit is also permitted to vary freely across
countries. The assumption that εit is independent across i is restrictive but will be relaxed
later on.
The essential insight that underlies this error structure is that if ρi is zero, git vanishes
under the assumption of zero initiation, in which case (6) is a cointegrated regression, as εit is
stationary by assumption. In other words, the value of ρi can be used to determine whether
(6) is cointegrated or not, a convenient feature that we will make use of in just a moment.
The monetary model posits (6) being a cointegrated relationship. If there is no structural
change, then this hypothesis can be readily tested by using existing tests for cointegration
in panel data. If there are breaks, however, conventional test is no longer valid since the
postulated relationship then becomes non-linear. This poses a serious problem for inference
since conventional tests cannot be used to discriminate between cointegration with structural
change and the absence of cointegration altogether. This issue was recently addressed by
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Westerlund (2005), who develops a panel Lagrange multiplier test for cointegration that
allows for multiple structural breaks.
The null hypothesis of interest is that all the countries in the panel are cointegrated, while
the alternative is that there is a non-vanishing fraction of countries that are not cointegrated.
This testing problem can be formulated in terms of ρi asH0 : ρi = 0 for all i, versusH1 : ρi 6= 0
for i = 1, ..., N1 and ρi = 0 for i = N1+1, ..., N , where N1 is such that N1N → 0 as N1, N →∞.
The Lagrange multiplier test statistic for this particular null hypothesis is given by
Z(M) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Mi+1∑
j=1
Tij∑
t=Tij−1+1
S2it
(Tij − Tij−1)2σ̂2i
,
where Sit =
∑t
s=Tij−1+1 ŵst, ŵit is the regression residual obtained by using any efficient
estimator of the cointegration vector such as the fully modified least squares estimator of
Phillips and Hansen (1990), and σ̂2i is the usual Newey and West (1994) long-run variance
estimator based on ŵit. Note how the statistic is written as an explicit function of M , the
vector of break locations. This is to indicate that it has been constructed for a certain break
structure, and that its asymptotic distribution depends on it. Note also that although Z(M)
might look complicated at first, closer inspection reveals that it is actually nothing more than
the cross-sectional average of the sum of Mi + 1 regime-specific statistics
Tij∑
t=Tij−1+1
S2it
(Tij − Tij−1)2σ̂2i
,
which are computed for subsamples of length Tij − Tij−1. These regime specific statistics
are in turn nothing but the usual Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity test applied to the
estimated regression residuals.
Now, given that the error εit satisfies the conditions mentioned above, Westerlund (2005)
shows that Z(M) reaches the following sequential limit as T → ∞ and then N → ∞ under
the null hypothesis √
N(Z(M)−E(Z(M)))√
var(Z(M))
⇒ N(0, 1),
where E(Z(M)) and var(Z(M)) are defined in Westerlund (2005). Thus, by standardiz-
ing Z(M) by its mean and standard deviation, we obtain a new test statistic that has an
asymptotic standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis. Under the alternative
hypothesis, being non-negative by construction, Z(M) diverges to positive infinity suggesting
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that the right tail of the normal distribution should be used to reject the null. Thus, the
critical value at the five percent significance level is 1.645.
The test of Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005) is constructed in an analogous fashion, and
details are therefore omitted. The essential difference is that since this test takes stationarity
and not cointegration as the null hypothesis, it is based on raw data and therefore does
not require an efficient estimator of the cointegration vector under the null. The Carrion-i-
Silvestre et al. (2005) test can actually be viewed as a restricted version of the Z(M) test.
The restriction being that the slopes βi and φi in (6) are zero, in which case ŵit in Z(M)
can be replaced with the demeaned and detrended counterpart of sit. Given this similarity in
construction, it should not come as a surprise that the Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005) test
is also asymptotically normal under the null hypothesis of stationarity.
Another similarity is that both tests use the same procedure to estimate the number of
breaks and their locations. This procedure, initially developed by Bai and Perron (1998,
2003), begins by estimating the breakpoints by minimizing the sum of squared residuals for
all permissable values of Mi. The resulting breakpoint estimates are then used together with
the associated sum of squares to estimate the number of breaks using an information criterion.
This procedure is then repeated N times to obtain the estimated number of breaks and their
locations for each country. Thus, in agreement with the overall unrestricted flavor of this
paper, the breaks are permitted to be fully heterogeneous. Moreover, since Mi may be zero,
a model with no breaks is also possible.
3.2 The bootstrap
As the above section makes clear, the tests of Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005) and Westerlund
(2005) are very similar in many respects. Yet another similarity of the two studies is that both
suggest using bootstrap methods to handle the impact of cross-section dependence, which, as
argued earlier, is very likely to be present in the type of data considered here. The particular
method opted for in this paper uses the sieve scheme of Westerlund and Edgerton (2007),
who propose a bootstrap panel cointegration test that is appropriate in the absence of breaks,
but that can be easily generalized to permit for such breaks.
The sieve scheme is appropriate here because if ρi is zero, wit reduces to εit, which in turn
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is stationary and therefore admits to the following autoregressive representation
εit =
∞∑
j=1
φiεit−j + ²it, (7)
where ²it is serially uncorrelated but potentially cross-correlated. The idea is to approximate
(7) by a model of finite order pi, which can then form the basis of a bootstrap plan that resam-
ples the N -dimensional vector ²t, thereby preserving the cross-sectional correlation structure.
If pi is allowed to increase with T at a certain rate, the model in (7) will be exactly matched
asymptotically as T →∞.
The first step is to replace εit with ŵit, and to compute the least squares residuals
²̂it = ŵit −
pi∑
j=1
φ̂ijŵit−j , (8)
which are then stacked into the N -dimensional vector ²̂t.
In the second step, a random sample ²∗t is taken from the empirical distribution that puts
mass 1T on each of the centered residuals ²̂t − 1T
∑T
j=1 ²̂j . We then generate the bootstrap
sample w∗it recursively from ²
∗
it using (8) with w
∗
it and ²
∗
it in place of ŵit and ²̂it, respectively.
In the third and final step, w∗it is used to generate via (6) a bootstrap version of sit, where
the parameters are replaced by their estimates, while the regressors are replaced by their
bootstrapped counterparts, see Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) for more details. Having
obtained the bootstrapped sample, it is now possible to obtain the bootstrapped cointegration
test. Repeating this procedure a large number of times gives the empirical distribution of
the test, which can be used to obtain bootstrapped p-values. Bootstrapping the Carrion-i-
Silvestre et al. (2005) test is even simpler, as now there are no slopes to estimate and no
regressors to bootstrap.
4 Empirical results
In this section, we first briefly describe the data, and then we present the empirical results
from the stationarity and cointegration tests of the monetary model. Finally, we present some
results on the PPP relation.
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4.1 Data
We use the same data set as Mark and Sul (2001).5 It consists of quarterly observations
for the nominal exchange rate, money supply and real GDP from 1973Q1 to 1997Q1 for 19
countries, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom and the United States. All variables are constructed with the United States as
numeraire country, meaning that the effective number of cross-sectional units in our panel is
18. The data originate with the International Monetary Fund database International Financial
Statistics, see Mark and Sul (2001) for further details.
4.2 Stationary tests
We begin by considering the integratedness of the nominal exchange rate, relative money
supply and relative output using the stationary test of Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005). In so
doing, we follow the recommendation of for example Papell (2002) and Harris et al. (2005),
and allow for a maximum of three breaks, which seem sufficient to capture all major changes
in the data. Also, since T is quite small in our panel, having more than three breaks will only
lead to imprecise break estimates. The exact number of breaks for each country is estimated
using the Schwartz information criterion. Also, to ensure that the break date estimator work
properly, we restrict the length of each regime to at least 15 percent of the total number of
time series observations, T . The bootstrap is implemented using 1, 000 replications and a
sieve order of 4
(
T
100
) 2
9 .
As for the deterministic specification of the monetary relationship, two models are consid-
ered. The first allows for both a constant and trend but no structural breaks, and constitutes
the most basic form of the monetary model that we consider. The second model generalizes
the first one by allowing for breaks in both intercept and trend, which if omitted can cause
deceptive inference. Thus, given the episodic behavior of the dollar in the 1980’s, the break
model stands out as the most natural one.
Table 1 shows the panel stationary test results for each variable. For each model, the
first row contains the test value, the second row contains the asymptotic p-value, and the
third row contains the bootstrapped p-value. The test results for the no break model suggest
5The data can be downloaded freely from the home page of Nelson Mark, which is available at
http://www.nd.edu/∼nmark/.
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that the null hypothesis of stationary can be safely rejected, since the asymptotic p-value
is zero for all variables. However, these p-values are computed under the assumption of
cross-section independence, which is unlikely to hold in this particular context. Therefore, in
order to account for this dependence, we use the bootstrapped p-values. As can be seen, the
conclusions are not altered by taking the cross-sectional correlation into account, at least not
at the 10 percent level.
Turning now to the model with breaks, we see that both the asymptotic and bootstrapped
p-values indicate that the presence of structural breaks does not interfere with the results
obtained from the no break model. One exception is relative output, for which we are unable
to reject the null of stationarity at the 10 percent level. However, if we omit the trend and
only allow for a breaking intercept, then the null is again strongly rejected. Therefore, since
the overall evidence in favor of a rejection is quite overwhelming, we choose to proceed as if
all the variables are in fact nonstationary.
4.3 Cointegration tests
The second step in our analysis is to test whether the variables are cointegrated, as predicted
by the monetary model. The bulk of the existing evidence based on panel data indicate
that cointegration, and thus also the monetary model, holds. However, as pointed out in
the introduction, most existing studies are generally quite restrictive in nature, which greatly
increases the risk of misleading conclusions.
In this section, we make an attempt to overcome these shortcomings by allowing for a large
amount of heterogeneity, cross-country correlation and structural breaks. For this purpose,
we now apply the Westerlund (2005) Z(M) test, which is implemented in the same way as
the stationary test but with the fully modified residuals in place of the raw data. The results
are presented in the second column to the right of Table 1. The first thing to note is that the
null hypothesis of cointegration is strongly rejected for the no break model, which obviously
goes against the theoretical predictions. As pointed out earlier, however, these results should
be interpreted with caution as erroneous omission of structural breaks are known to make
this kind of tests biased towards no cointegration. Indeed, if we allow for structural shifts as
well as cross-country dependence, the null hypothesis of cointegration cannot be rejected at
the 10 percent level. This finding suggests that the variables are in fact cointegrated around
a broken trend, which is in support of the monetary model.
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The leftmost panel of Table 2 reports the estimated breakpoints obtained as a bi-product
when applying the Z(M) test to the model with breaks. With the exception of Australia,
we see that three breaks are found for all countries. Thus, for all countries but Australia,
we end up estimating the maximum number of breaks. This is in agreement with the results
of Perron (1997), who point out that the type of information criteria used here cannot take
into account the effect of different distributions of the data and possible serial correlation in
the regression errors. In fact, as Perron (1997) showed in simulations, although most criteria
perform reasonably well when the errors are not correlated, they have a strong tendency to
overestimate the number of breaks when serial correlation is present. Of course, the purpose
in this paper is not the correct estimation of the number of breaks per se but rather the
accounting of the effects of these breaks. Thus, overestimation is not a serious problem in the
sense that the model is still free to estimate the associated break parameters to zero.
Looking at Table 2 we see that there is a preponderance of breaks located around the
middle of the sample, which seem very reasonable from an historical point of view with events
such as oil price shocks, the formation of European Monetary System and, in particular, the
rise and fall of the dollar. Specifically, while the breaks found in the late 1970’s agree with
the oil price shocks of that period, the breaks in the early 1980’s are more likely to reflect
the start of appreciation of the dollar, with the breaks in the middle of the 1980’s reflecting
the subsequent transition from dollar appreciation to dollar depreciation. The breaks in the
early 1990’s can be attributed to the formation of European Monetary System when most
European countries abolished their capital controls. Another possibility is that these breaks
reflect the end of the dollar depreciation in 1987.
Thus, we see that the break date estimator is able to correctly identify most of the major
structural events in the sample. Interestingly, these are exactly the events thought to have
shifted the PPP relation during this period, see Papell (2002) for a more thorough discussion.
This is important because it suggests that the observed breaks in the monetary model may
well be due to breaks in the underlying PPP relation. We will elaborate on this in the next
section.
4.4 The PPP relationship
We have argued that one possible explanation for the presence of structural breaks in the
monetary model is that the PPP relationship may not have been stable during the sample
12
period. A natural way to test this hypothesis is to estimate and test the PPP relationship
for structural breaks. If our story is correct, the estimated breakpoints should match those
presented for the monetary model in Table 2. In order to perform this test, we follow the
recommendation of Papell (2002) and Papell and Prodan (2006), and estimate the following
model with breaks in both the intercept and trend
sit = µij + τijt+ δi(pit − p∗t ) + eit, (9)
where δi is a country specific slope. As before, the index j indicates the breaks. If the trend
qualified version of PPP holds, then the disturbance eit should be stationary so that the
nominal exchange rate and the relative price level are cointegrated. To test whether this is
in fact the case, we again employ the Z(M) test.
Figure 1: Nominal dollar exchange rates with fitted trend functions.
Similar to the results of the monetary model, the results reported in Table 1 suggest that
the PPP relation emerges only once the presence of cross-country dependence and structural
breaks has been taken into account.6 These results are consistent with Papell (2002) and
6Of course, evidence in favor of trend qualified PPP does not automatically imply that PPP is fulfilled,
as PPP requires reversion towards a constant mean in the long run. In other words, trend qualified PPP is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for PPP to hold. See Basher and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2008) further
details.
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Figure 2: Nominal dollar exchange rates with fitted trend functions.
Figure 3: Nominal dollar exchange rates with fitted trend functions.
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Papell and Prodan (2006), who also find that PPP must be rejected unless the possibility of
structural breaks is entertained.
In view of this, we now proceed to examine the estimated PPP breaks reported in the
rightmost panel of Table 2. It is seen that, within a few quarters accuracy, almost all of the
breaks in the monetary model can be derived from breaks in the underlying PPP relationship.
Hence, it appears as that the instability of the monetary model can be largely explained by
an instable PPP relation.
To further illustrate the connection between the monetary model and PPP relation, Fig-
ures 1 to 3 plot the nominal exchange rates together with the fitted trend functions for the
model with breaks in both constant and trend. The solid line represents the nominal ex-
change rate, the semisolid line represents the monetary model, and the dashed line represents
the PPP relation. It can easily be seen that nearly all exchange rates exhibit several breaks
in the 1980’s, most of which seem to reflect the appreciation and depreciation of the dollar.
More importantly, we see that the trend lines for both the monetary and PPP models seem
to provide a very good fit to the nominal exchange rate for all 18 countries. The fact that the
two trend lines appear to follow each other so closely gives an indication as to the importance
of the PPP relation in the monetary model.
5 Conclusions
This paper reconsiders the possibility of cointegration between the nominal exchange rate
and its fundamentals, as specified by the monetary exchange rate model. The methodological
approach used for this purpose is flexible enough to accommodate a large degree of country
specific heterogeneity, cross-country dependence as well as multiple structural breaks.
Based on data for 18 industrialized countries between 1973Q1 and 1997Q1, we find that
the evidence in favor of the monetary model depends upon whether cross-country dependence
and structural breaks are considered or not. When the effects of cross-country dependence
and breaks are ignored, the monetary model fails, whereas when these effects are taken into
account, the monetary model seems to hold. Consistent with other studies, we find that
three breaks are sufficient to capture the episodic behavior of the dollar exchange rates in
the 1980’s, and that the locations of the estimated breaks correspond well with the structural
shifts in the underlying PPP relationship.
One implication of our results is that the predictability of the traditional monetary model
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can be improved by allowing for breaks in the forecasting regression. Thus, the poor forecast-
ing performance noted by Meese and Rogoff (1983) and the subsequent literature on exchange
rate predictability may simply be due to the fact that the parameters in the estimated model
have not been stable.7 As we have demonstrated, one possible explanation for this instability
is that the underlying PPP relation may have been unstable too.
7Indeed, after incorporating temporal instability into the Meese and Rogoff (1983) forecasting experiment,
Goldberg and Frydman (1996) find that the monetary models outperform the random walk model by consid-
erable margins.
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